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Abstract 
Ethical problems resulting from brain research have given rise to a new discipline termed neuroethics, representing 
a new kind of knowledge capable of discovering the neural basis for universal ethics. The article (1) tries to evaluate 
the contributions of neuroethics to medical ethics and its suitability to outline the foundations of universal ethics, (2) 
critically analyses the process of founding this universal ethic. The potential benefits of applying neuroimaging, psy-
chopharmacology and neurotechnology have to be carefully weighed against their potential harm. In view of these 
questions, an intensive dialogue between neuroscience and the humanities is more necessary than ever.
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Background
Toulmin provocatively postulated that medicine saved 
Western ethics from its implicit, although increasingly 
decadence product of academic discussions with little 
concrete value for the lives of human beings, when creat-
ing bioethics based on the urgency of physicians at the 
bedsides of their patients [1]. Despite his astute reflec-
tion, he did not consider two aspects. Firstly, beginning 
in the 1960s, philosophy made an important ethical 
shift as a result of a “rehabilitation of practical philoso-
phy”, which means a priority on the practical, immedi-
ate and factual [2, 3]. On the other hand, medical ethics 
has a long history that it has never abjured; moreover, it 
has always constituted the first foundation of medicine’s 
ends, theories and practices, and continues to be in full 
force significantly in the twentieth century [4–6].
The present work has three objectives. The first is to 
outline the birth of neuroethics from the ethical tradition 
of medicine. The second is to consider the main achieve-
ments, advances and future perspectives of neuroethics, 
and the third is to discuss the foundations underlying this 
new way of understanding medical morals.
Origin of neuroethics
Medicine emerged in Greece as a profession, that is, a 
professio, which has a religious origin: to profess is an act 
that demands delivering, an activity that demands com-
mitting one’s self entirely and for life. It is a kind of con-
secration and those who exercise it are consecrates [7, 8]. 
From this the Hippocratic “Oath” was born at the dawn-
ing of medicine (tekhné iatriké) around the fifth century 
B.C. and consequently every physician is committed not 
only to executing his/her techniques well, but also to pro-
fess a moral. This moral is not just any, but rather is one 
that tends toward perfection or excellence (areté) and the 
doctor is a special person because he/she seeks to con-
duct a virtuous life. The moral perspective has accompa-
nied us continuously throughout history, in completely 
distinct civilizations like the Hindu, Jewish, Arabic and 
Chinese. This means that the raison d’être of the moral 
perspective is so deep and so deeply rooted in our tradi-
tion that any person that takes up its exercise is required 
to begin with a strict and solemn ritual, that of taking an 
oath, real or symbolic, of respect and obedience [9–11].
The situation changed dramatically after the first half of 
the twentieth century and in a short time bioethics burst 
forth, imposed itself and spread with unstoppable force; 
despite the numerous investigations dedicated to its gen-
esis—medical, legal, economic, historical, philosophical-, 
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there has not yet been a satisfactory elucidation of the 
motives that provoked this revolution that definitively 
upset the way in which medicine is practiced. In short, 
there is a before and an after of this event [12–14]. With 
a bilocated birth, ecological bioethics, headed by Van 
Rensselaer Potter [15] and medical bioethics, guided by 
André Hellegers and Daniel Callahan [16, 17], followed 
the proposal of the cancer specialist Madison: “As a new 
discipline….combines biological knowledge with knowl-
edge of the systems of human values” [18]. Its objective 
was ambitious, to bridge two modes of understanding 
the condition of human illness based on biological sci-
ences and the humanities and its values. Its spectacular 
expansion exceeded any prediction and in a few years it 
compromised not only medicine in its totality, but also 
law, economy, philosophy and politics. Three attributes 
characterize its growth when applied to human illness: to 
elaborate specific procedures that serve to guide medical 
action in its very diverse fields; a particular concern about 
its application with the aim that it not remain in dead let-
ters, because of which it was necessary to recommend 
sanctions in cases of negligence or abuse; and developing 
certain principles sufficiently general that they can serve 
as the basis for ordering behavior and taken in account 
requires acceptance by all members in order to aspire to 
universal in an axiological and polytheistic society like 
that of today [19]. In other words, foundations, systems 
of prescriptions or procedural guides and regulated and 
effective sanctions.
Despite the coincidence in time, the situation was very 
different from the ethical problems resulting from the 
biotechnological revolution: uncertainty, risk and danger. 
In the early 1970s, the revolutionary cellular and animal 
virus research began to show its misty and ominous face: 
the growing threat to which researchers were exposing 
the entirety of humanity. Alarms went off vividly, recall-
ing the words of Oppenheimer after the fateful nuclear 
tests, “physicists have known sin and this is a knowl-
edge which they cannot lose” [20]. It was in June 1973 
and again from February 24–27 in 1975 at the Asilomar 
conferences on the risks of recombinant DNA that, after 
heated discussion, safety guidelines were approved with 
two types of protective barriers, biological and physical, 
and four levels of risk. With what was termed the “pre-
cautionary principle” and the certain awareness that the 
manipulation of genetic material is always done in the 
context of uncertainty, GenEthics was born. Its main con-
clusion, unprecedented as it had never been expressed 
before so unequivocally, was that humanity had to be 
considered as a limiting end to scientific and techni-
cal interventions, for example, to positive and negative 
genetic engineering [21]. But at the same time the biolog-
ical sciences passionately took up again the doctrine that 
has moved it with growing force in the beginning of the 
19th century, the essence of human beings lies in their 
primarily biological condition and empirical data is prov-
ing that it is the gene where the ultimate truth lies.
The situation changed and again explosively when in 
May 2002, 150 biologists, neuroscientists, physicians, 
lawyers, psychologists, and sociologists met in San Fran-
cisco and proclaimed, in the words of the journalist and 
organizer William Safire, that neuroethics had been 
born and that it was characterized as “the study of ethi-
cal, legal and social questions that emerge when scien-
tific discoveries about the brain led to medical practices, 
legal interpretations and health and social policies” [22]. 
It was concluded that neuroscience and its technology 
had progressed with such vigor that encompass, drive, 
configure and determine decisively the different areas of 
human activity—art, philosophy, law, economics, theol-
ogy, medicine. A century ago Husserl firmly maintained 
that “there is no idea more powerful and whose advance 
is more irresistible than that of science …, nothing can 
stop its triumphal march” [23]; now neuroethics reaffirms 
it with propriety and feels authorized to assert that it is 
empirical science that can and should provide the fun-
damental responses and basic truths about the place of 
humans in the cosmos. In this it is similar to GenEthics, 
but from there also differences emerge. While GenEth-
ics reminds us of the potential dangers, it promotes the 
regulation of its actions and elaborates strict precaution-
ary protocols (which have been becoming progressively 
more flexible over time), Neuroethics raises as an inal-
ienable right to investigate without limits or hindrance, 
has as a goal to provide the scientific basis of the ethic 
supported in empirical findings and assumes among its 
tasks that of modifying the human essence, or some its 
features, according to advances in research. Neurophi-
losophy emerged with unusual speed as a result of its 
proposals and in consonance with them burst forth neu-
rophilosophy, neurotheology, neuropolitics, neuroeco-
nomics, neuroaesthetics, neuroeducation, just to name 
the main disciplines, novice disciplines that have placed 
traditions in check and obliged them to rethink under 
threat of being relegated to the past.
The neuroethics project
In 2002 Roskies proposed dividing the field into two 
branches that, although intimately connected, are dis-
tinct and require being differentiated in order to refine 
the project [24]: ethics of neuroscience, a moral frame-
work aimed at regulating, ordering and guiding behavior 
in neuroscientific research and the application of knowl-
edge with human beings, given that studies can compro-
mise transcendental aspects of our condition. On the 
contrary, the neuroscience of ethics seeks to determine 
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where morality is born as such and what is its primary 
substance, constituting the nucleus of the human sub-
ject and perhaps what distinguishes us from all the other 
beings on the planet. In other words, applied neuroeth-
ics and fundamental neuroethics, both equally products 
of current neuroscience [25]. While the first includes 
studies that generally deal with circumspect aspects, the 
second is more ambitious and is related to all of West-
ern thought: it seeks to respond to the basic dimensions 
of our being, like the mind-body relationship, aporia 
determinism-freedom, self-identity, the possibility of a 
universal ethic, the nature of morality, the human essence 
as such. If we remember that for GenEthics the truth of 
the human being is found in the gene, now it is said to be 
in the neuron and consequently terms are used like “neu-
ronal man”, “the ethical brain”, “the thinking brain”, “the 
computational mind”, “the empathic brain”, “synaptic self” 
without “philosophical zombies” [26–31].
The neuroethic project must be rightly understood. It 
has been developed according to hypotheses, and these, 
as is characteristic of the natural sciences, are generated 
by testing and refuting and, as a multidisciplinary work, 
requires close collaboration of different professionals, a 
task that involves stimulation, confusion and disputes. 
But one thing remains clears: finally one feels to be on 
the sure path of strict and rigorous science to understand 
morality, the “Faktum of the moral conscience”, as Kant 
said, although in the opposite direction of the thinker of 
Könisberg because it is based on sensitive empirical data 
[32]. The French neurophysiologist Changeux expressed 
with the conviction and security of a scientist when con-
fronting a philosopher, in this case Ricoeur, on dictating 
the last foundation: the “natural foundation, which for 
me represents something without any reference to any-
thing occult, supernatural or magical, but rather only 
to a material nature, a unique and sufficient reality, that 
exists and is understood only by itself ” [33]. Evers called 
this basic position of neuroscience “illustrated materi-
alism” [34], a posture that has come to be so penetrat-
ing that this has been termed “the century of the brain”. 
Despite the undeniable novelty, we must remember that 
it has a long tradition. “I will consider the actions and 
appetites of men just as if it were a question of lines, 
planes and bodies”, wrote Spinoza in his Ethics [35], and 
Descartes, despite the todays misunderstandings of his 
position, also admitted “that [man] is not of a differ-
ent nature from that of fires in inanimate bodies” [36]. 
Moreover, this comprehension reaches even to the pre-
Socratic philosophers like Democritus: “we know noth-
ing accurately in reality but only as it changes according 
to the bodily condition, and the constitution of those 
things that flow upon the body [including the brain] and 
impinge upon it” [37].
Ethics of neurocience
What areas have provided the most convincing answers 
in this field? This is not easy to assess because the per-
spectives, questions and techniques of execution are 
highly varied, even contradictory, but can be summa-
rized with the following: (1) Regulated encouragement 
of introspection centered on experiences and memories, 
both traumatic and non-traumatic, pertaining to the inti-
macy of existence, to abolish or transmute these, seek-
ing to modify the self-conception of personal history; (2) 
Implanting ideas, attitudes, events, experiences or ideol-
ogies different from those that the individual has and that 
characterize him/her; (3) Developing tests and measure-
ment of modifications of brain images aimed at unmask-
ing pretenses, falsehoods, lies or intentional inventions in 
trials or against litigants that seek to obtain direct advan-
tages or indirect internal emotional retribution; (4) fixing 
responsibility and imputability of acts thanks to the find-
ings of “brain prints” in neuroimages or of “test of guilty 
knowledge” in brain waves; (5) quantitative instrumental 
evaluation of the capacities to deliver informed consent 
that permits comparing them to objectively standardized 
tables that reveal whether an individual is incapable of 
making rational choices in her/his best interest because 
he/she cannot overcome the most minimal barrier; (6) 
prediction of future diseases by means of neuroimages 
that allows for taking measures pertinent to the person 
involved, loved ones, insurers and healthcare givers; (7) 
modifications of the personality with the aim of trans-
forming and even recreating the self-identity of indi-
viduals with severe and disabling disorders or that have 
disturbing features, through ablation of parts of the brain 
or minimally invasive neuroengineering micro-implants 
that record, analyze and modify neuronal signals; (8) 
studies of cognitive and emotional functions like that 
of alertness, attention, memory, mood and sensations 
of wellbeing, pleasure and happiness through the use of 
drugs, a kind of “mind doping” with the aim of improving 
and perfecting the capacities and broadening its borders 
in both sick and healthy individuals [38–41].
It is clear that underlying these experiments, meas-
urements with neuroimages and tests touch on central 
themes of existence which raise questions of the essence 
of our being and, with this, the legitimacy, scope and 
immediate and future effects of these assays. It should 
not be forgotten that science is not axiologically neutral 
but rather is guided by interests that, according to Haber-
mas, are of domination or technical, practical or under-
standing of the sense and emancipatory or liberatory, and 
neuroethics is submitted to one or several of these to a 
greater or lesser degree [42, 43].
Without breaking them down, the most decisive 
dimensions to be modified can be listed: (1) Identity, 
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recognition of itself as a unit despite the changes it has 
experienced and generated based on its own definition 
and that which others have provided; (2) privacy, an inte-
rior place that is experienced as inalienable and that no 
one can, should or has the faculty to transgress; (3) self-
determination, the feeling of being the agent that decides 
actions and choices; (4) responsibility over ideas, acts and 
the direction of life, against which there must be ongo-
ing accountability; (5) perfecting human dispositions and 
capacities evaluated according to ideals, goals, values and 
current ambitions.
Neurocience of ethics
The most revolutionary, confrontational and controver-
sial aspect is that neuroethics seeks to found ethics dif-
ferently from the traditional philosophical and religious 
foundations. Without entering into the details, nuances 
and details that the theme requires for its precise artic-
ulation, we note that three aspects are central: human 
attributes that are involved in this study, research that 
deal with human freedom and the genesis of morality 
[44].
What questions does Neuroethics seek to answer, ques-
tions that have beset the West since its origins because 
they suppose a mode of understanding our way of being 
and determine the tékhne tou biou, the art of living, using 
the expression of Foucault? [45]. (1) the brain-body rela-
tionship, which began with the Greeks conceiving of 
reality as the physis and exploded violently with the met-
aphysical proposals of Descartes, proposals that meant 
the rupture with antiquity and the beginning of the mod-
ern age; (2) the identity of the self, essence of our interior 
self that provides us with a way of recognizing ourselves 
but can be reified if we do not differentiate between iden-
tity and selfness, identity-idem and identity-ipse accord-
ing to Ricoeur, a difference that with difficulty allows for 
operationalizing and less quantifying [46]; (3) determin-
ism-freedom, to feel the agent of one’s acts, thoughts 
and decisions although we know we are conditioned by 
nature itself, history and circumstance; (4) the essence 
of morality, that is, what is its primary consistency that 
seems to distinguish us from other living beings; y (5) a 
universal ethic, the possibility of a common morality for 
humanity beyond societies.
Are we truly free at the moment of deliberating and 
choosing our responses? Or is it our neuronal networks 
that determine our acts inadvertently although con-
stantly? The bold essays of Libet, corroborated by Hag-
gar and Eimer, raise doubts that the will is free to choose 
actions (understand one’s self by motives, know one’s 
self as agent and author, and believe one’ self to have the 
power to conduct one’s self distinctly in externally simi-
lar situations), it is rather an illusion that is projected 
subsequently into the past [47–50]. Measuring the cer-
ebral potential of the secondary motor cortex it was 
determined that they are ahead of conscious decisions 
to make movements by 350 ms, which makes it plausible 
that there are extra-conscious neuronal mechanisms that 
effectively provoke supposedly willed actions that, in ret-
rospect, are erroneously catalogued as products of will. 
Measurements of brain waves have shown equally illu-
sionary the control and authority we suppose we have to 
execute thoughtless tasks, like moving a cursor or inter-
fering with the alternate movements of fingers through 
magnetic transcranial stimulation [51]. Other neurobi-
ologists adhere to this conception, because of which it 
is time to modify this belief sustained for centuries and 
fervently believed in by popular psychology, and accept 
that purported conscious causality, the affirmation that 
is chosen in daily life according to our will, is anything 
but real, is to attribute to us subsequently what is only 
the product of extrapersonal neuronal processes that 
occurred before [52].
If these essays demonstrate that “the function of the 
human brain is to take decisions” [53], does this imply 
that facing a moral dilemma the individual decides 
according to how his/her brain is structured neuronally 
and not wielding the best arguments? The hypoth-
esis seems probable for two reasons: the ethical judg-
ments are consecutive to extra-conscious neurochemical 
changes and, as Greene indicates, the functioning brain 
area corresponds to affective, sensate and intuitive, not to 
intellectual or rational areas [54]. Works from different 
centers agree in contesting the postulate of Kant: what we 
must do is determined by what we would do “if reason 
completely determined our will” [55].
Studies about moral dilemmas culminate in the pos-
sibly more surprising proposal: Is morality a product 
of the pact of living in society, or on the contrary, does 
its genesis lie in the evolution of the human mind since 
our appearance on earth? Of the numerous investiga-
tions dedicated to elucidating this matter, we choose two 
surveys responded to by volunteers, keeping in mind 
that these are rapidly replicated, refined and expanded 
in other centers. (1) A passenger on a train realizes that 
the conductor has fallen unconscious and is faced with 
a choice: if he does nothing six students walking on the 
rails will be hit by the train while if he presses a pedal the 
train will take a railway siding and hit a laborer working 
on the rails. Some 90  % of respondents say they would 
save the students. (2) A subject is in the way of a train 
out of control with six students on the track whose only 
escape is if the subject pushes aside an obese man beside 
him, which will cause the death of the obese man. Only 
10 % of respondents find it legitimate to push the obese 
man out of the way even though the other six would die 
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[56, 57]. The two dilemmas are similar in their structure, 
although they have opposite results. Scanner readings of 
brain waves while subject consider moral dilemmas like 
the situations above provide notable results; much more 
time is taken when it can be considered legitimate to 
harm another although it involves saving others and the 
reverse when it is appear that it is not legitimate, that is, 
in this case the decision is made more rapidly. In effect, 
faced with a personal ethical dilemma like directly hurt-
ing someone, it takes 7 s to decide what to do, while in an 
impersonal situation, that is to indirectly harm someone, 
it takes only 4 s. The response seems to be located in the 
different areas of the brain that are involved: in case of 
the personal dilemma, the frontal lobe, prefrontal medial 
cortex and limbic system and amygdala are activated, 
areas that are closely connected with emotions, affectivity 
and social cognition, while with the impersonal dilemma 
the areas involved are related to cognitive capacities.
Wilson has attempted to respond to this problem—per-
sonal and impersonal dilemmas—reviewing the results of 
research involving the evolutionary origin of social rela-
tionships [58]. Archeological studies have shown that in 
the Pleistocene primitive humans were hunter-gatherers, 
they lived in small communities of no more than 130 
individuals of the same race and religion. The close, per-
manent and firm social link allowed them to survive and 
successfully confront the multiple dangers of an inhos-
pitable and threatening environment. Life depended on 
mutual support, shared tasks and help provided among 
the members of the tribe. Thus a primary moral was born 
by means of a process of natural selection of affects, emo-
tions and instincts that favored mutual help with those 
close by and systematically excluded or expelled stran-
gers. Consequently, morality is the final expression of 
adaptation, a product of survival by natural selection. The 
brain imprints upon its neuronal circuits these codes of 
moral functioning with the passing of millions of years, 
and these codes, because they are recorded on neurons, 
synapses and circuits, are universal, extending through-
out the human race. These rules of moral procedure are 
imposed rapidly on actions, without recourse to higher 
cognitive or intellectual rational processes, which would 
delay their action and lead to the demise of the subject 
and the tribe [56, 57, 59]. This morality of group salvation 
based on reciprocity to achieve personal salvation has to 
be ruled according to a categorical imperative that is very 
distinct what Kant proposed, which has become the code 
of modernity and that consists of something like “love the 
near and reject the distant”.
Balance and perspective
Are we now as we used to understand ourselves before 
the era of neuroethics? Evidently not, and the change has 
altered how we conceive of ourselves morally, although 
still in the field of moral thought and not that of moral 
living. Do we have hard data to feel confident about our 
ethical inclinations? Yes and no, because as we do not 
believe in freedom without more precision, the known 
facts are ambiguous and at times contradictory, but offer 
hope of continuing in deepening our self-knowledge and 
in modifying our traditional way of judging ourselves. 
Can we take stock after such a short time? It may be risky 
and superficial, but the possibilities that are opened up 
are so important and profound that they deserve the fol-
lowing considerations, shallow as well as provisional and 
subject to ongoing review [60]. Three aspects are the 
most decisive: immediate advances and future perspec-
tives, methodological problems involved and the ontol-
ogy underlying the investigations.
1. The introduction of the empirical methods of the 
natural sciences has represented not only the con-
tribution of concrete, effective and novel data to 
understand the moral phenomena but has also 
spectacularly broadened the field of investigation. 
But above all it represents a revolutionary perspec-
tive, and to a certain point, unprecedented in inves-
tigation. Although it has been a long held aspiration 
of western thought to construct an ethic based on 
belonging, firstly, necessarily and perhaps sufficiently, 
of the human being to the biological life of the uni-
verse, neuroethics has boldly made the leap. It has 
ascended from a reflective to a scientific level under-
stood as possible of being replicated and refuted with 
arguments and standardized tests, or, employing a 
distorted version of the concept of Popper, falsifia-
bled [61]. It is only in its beginnings and the num-
ber of publications is growing exponentially so that 
it is difficult to predict the directions future scien-
tific projects will take. Whatever the findings, they 
accrue and illuminate our current knowledge from 
unexpected visions. It is that knowledge, as Aristotle 
asserted, is born of wonder [62] and one cannot but 
be astonished by this approach and the avalanche of 
data from laboratories.
2. The methodological problems underlying investiga-
tions cannot be ignored. On the contrary, they should 
be examined in all their complexity to advance with 
safe passage and to avoid falling into old illusions as a 
result of haste, lack of rigorousness and enthusiastic 
but naïve conclusions by venturing into fields distant 
from one’s own specialty. They are multiple, with dif-
ferent scope, many with serious difficulties. A brief 
list indicates the basic questions: designs purposely 
developed for laboratories, that is far from reality and 
its complexities, giving priority to replicability over 
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verisimilitude; the development of its findings seek-
ing probabilistic before causal connections, perhaps 
because of the greatest difficulty of the latter; lack of 
confirmation of the analysis and results by third party 
researchers, although they attempt to respect the var-
iables; frequent use of hypothesis, conceptions and 
models from very diverse disciplines, which lends 
itself to confusion, mistakes and lack of rigorousness 
because the data had not being acquired or processed 
in similar ways, that is, the extrapolation can fall into 
simplisticness; and abrupt ontological transit from 
brain waves to subjective internal experiences, with-
out due precaution and training, as Varela noted in 
reference to the theme, although in a very different 
context [63].
3. Metaphysics, which is sustaining throughout the 
edifice, cannot be resolved by empirical science 
because science itself is the result of a certain onto-
logical conception that makes it possible, and that, at 
least, comes from the modern epoch. As Zubiri said, 
modernity has consisted of a progressive entification 
of reality and a logification of thinking [64]. In turn, 
transcending the cerebral “is” to the moral “duty” is 
not a trival matter, as Hume emphasized terming it 
a naturalistic fallacy [65]. Heidegger pointed it out 
with special profundity, current natural science pro-
ceeds according to a special thought, calculating 
and re-presentative (vor-stellende) [66]. This means 
that its manner of understanding reality, in this case, 
the reality of human beings in their moral slope, is 
dominating, im-posing, target-ing, calculating, and 
with that, numbering. What gets the scientist think-
ing is not something little, their data are not minor, 
but a price must be paid: take the “objective” reality 
pertaining to our condition but without consider-
ing the “way of being” proper to manhood as such. 
Objective science sees morality as an object-posed 
(ge-stezt) before a subject, as a norm (Ge-setzt) that 
exists in the brain, moral consciousness as a reified 
court that investigates the self and its actions. It is 
overlooked that our being is nothing but a project-
of-being, never defined for once and for all, free to 
choose us and reach ourselves, or lose ourselves and 
mimicking ourselves with things of everyday life. It is 
clear, although we choose at every moment, we are 
not free, that is, we do not have the freedom to give 
ourselves our first foundation since it has already 
been given, we are already-in(schon-sein)-the-world, 
we are thrown among things and persons from the 
moment we are born [67]. Neuroethics must not 
repeat the insufficiencies of the neuropsychological 
sciences born in laboratories of the early twentieth 
century, programs that were full of hope and ideals 
but ended in not fulfilling expectations because of 
lack of meditative thinking [68]. To transform medi-
cal ethics into scientific neuroethics requires review-
ing its metaphysical basis to be at the height of its 
future conquests and thus avoid confusing, mixing 
and dissolving the data with that which allows and 
makes possible that the data appears [69, 70].
Competing interests
The author declare that he has no competing interests.
Received: 3 December 2015   Accepted: 12 February 2016
References
 1. Toulmin S. How medicine saved the life of ethics. Persp Biol Med. 
1982;25:736–50.
 2. Habermas J. Moralbewuβtsein und kommunikatives Handeln. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp; 1983.
 3. D´Agostini F. Analíticos y continentales. Guía de la filosofía de los últimos 
treinta años. Madrid: Cátedra, 2000.
 4. Baker R, McCollough LB, editors. The Cambridge world history of medical 
ethics. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2009.
 5. Pellegrino ED. A philosophical basis of medical practice: toward a phi-
losophy and ethic of the healing profession. New York: Oxford University 
Press; 1981.
 6. Gifford F, comp. Handbook of philosophy of science. Philosophy of medi-
cine. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2011.
 7. Sigerist H. E. Anfängen der Medizin. Von den primitiven und archaischen 
Medizin bis zum goldenen Zeitalter in Griegenland. Zürich: Europa Verlag, 
1963.
 8. Figueroa G. The virtuous doctor in cinema: the final examination. Rev 
Med Chile. 2014;142:1324–9.
 9. Laín Entralgo P. La medicina hipocrática. Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 
1970.
 10. Miles SH. The Hippocratic oath and the ethics of medicine. New York: 
Oxford University Press; 2004.
 11. Reich WT. The word “bioethics”: its birth and the legacies of those who 
shaped it. Kenn Inst Ethic J. 1994;4:319–35.
 12. Figueroa G. Is bioethics Circe, the enchantress of medicine? Rev Méd 
Chile. 2001;129:209–17.
 13. Gracia D. Fundamentos de bioética. Madrid: Eudema; 1989.
 14. Reich WT. Encyclopedia of bioethics. 2nd ed. New York: Mac Millan and 
Free Press; 1995.
 15. van Potter R. Bioethics: a bridge to the future. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall; 
1971.
 16. Callahan D. Bioethics as a discipline. Hastings Center Studies. 
1973;1:66–73.
 17. Callahan D. Setting limits. New York: Simon and Schuster; 1987.
 18. van Potter R. Bioethics, the science of survival. Persp Biol Med. 
1970;14:127–53.
 19. MacIntyre A. After virtue. London: Duckworth; 1985.
 20. Oppenheimer JR. Physics in the contemporary world. Bull Atom Scien-
tists. 1948;4:66–71.
 21. Cortina A. Ética de las biotecnologías. Isegoría. 2002;27:73–89.
 22. Safire W. Visions for a new field of “neuroethics”. In: Marcus SJ, editor. 
Neuroethics: Mapping the field. New York: The Dana Press; 2002. p. 3–9.
 23. Husserl E. Die Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft. Frankfurt: Kloster-
mann; 1981.
 24. Roskies A. Neuroethics for the new millennium. Neuron. 2002;35:21–3.
 25. Cortina A. Neuroética y neuropolítica. Sugerencias para la educación 
moral. Madrid: Tecnos; 2011.
 26. Searle JR. The mystery of consciousness. New York: New York Review of 
Books; 1997.
Page 7 of 7Figueroa  Biol Res  (2016) 49:11 
•  We accept pre-submission inquiries 
•  Our selector tool helps you to find the most relevant journal
•  We provide round the clock customer support 
•  Convenient online submission
•  Thorough peer review
•  Inclusion in PubMed and all major indexing services 
•  Maximum visibility for your research
Submit your manuscript at
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central 
and we will help you at every step:
 27. Changeux J-P, Ricoeur P. Ce qui nous fait penser: La nature et la règle. 
Paris: Odile Jacob; 1998.
 28. LeDoux J. The synaptic self: how our brains become who we are. New 
York: Viking; 2002.
 29. Gazzaniga MS. The ethical brain. New York: Dana Press; 2005.
 30. Gazzaniga MS. Who´s in charge. New York: Ecco books; 2011.
 31. Churchland PS. Braintrust: What neuroscience tells us about morality. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press; 2011.
 32. Kant I. Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. Kant I. Werke. Band 6. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968. p. 105–302.
 33. Changeux J-P, Ricoeur P. Lo que nos hace pensar. La naturaleza y la regla. 
Barcelona: Península; 1999.
 34. Neuroéthique Evers K. Quand la matière s´éveille. Paris: Jacob; 2009.
 35. Spinoza B. Ética. Madrid: Alianza; 1998.
 36. Descartes R. Oeuvres et lettres. Paris: NRF; 1937.
 37. Cordero NL, La Croce E. Santa Cruz de Prunes MI, trad. Los filósofos 
presocráticos. Obras II. Madrid: Gredos; 2007.
 38. Fuchs T. Ethical issues in neuroscience. Curr Opinion Psychiatry. 
2006;19:600–7.
 39. Appiah KA. Experiments in ethics. Harvard: President and Fellows of 
Harvard College; 2008.
 40. Illes J, ed. Neuroethics. Defining the issues in theory, practice and policy. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
 41. Cortina A. Las fronteras de la persona. El valor de los animales, la dignidad 
de los hombres. Madrid: Santillana, 2009.
 42. Habermas J. Erkenntnis und Interesse. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp; 1968.
 43. Habermas J. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. 2 Bände. Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1982.
 44. Figueroa G. Neuroethics: reflections on the latent principles of morals in 
medicine. Rev Méd Chile. 2012;140:1078–84.
 45. Foucault M. L´hermeneutique du sujet. Cours au Collège de France 
1981–1982. Paris: Seuil/Gallimard 2001.
 46. Ricoeur P. Soi-même comme un autre. Paris: Editions du Seuil; 1990.
 47. Libet B. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in 
voluntary action. Behav Brain Sci. 1985;8:529–66.
 48. Libet B. Do we have free will? J Conscious St. 1999;6:45–51.
 49. Haggard P, Eimer M. On the relation between brain potentials and the 
awareness of voluntary movements. Exp Brain Res. 1999;126:128–33.
 50. Haidt J, Bjorklund E. Social intuitionists answer six questions about moral 
psychology. En: Sinnott-Amstrong W, comp. Moral psychology. Vol 2. 
Cambridge: The MIT press, 2008. p. 181–217.
 51. Brasil-Nieto JP, Pascual-Leone A, Valla-Sole J. Focal transcranial magnetic 
stimulation and response bias in a forced-choice task. J Neurol Neurosurg 
Psychiatry. 1992;55:954–66.
 52. Varela F. Conciencia del tiempo presente. In: Varela F, editor. El fenómeno 
de la vida. Santiago: Dolmen; 2000. p. 317–65.
 53. Gazzaniga MS, Steven MS. Free will in the 21st century: a discussion of 
neuroscience and the law. In: Gardland B, editor. neuroscience and the 
law. New York: Dana Press; 2004.
 54. Greene JD. From neural “is” to moral “ought”. What are the moral implica-
tions of neuroscientific psychology? Nat Rev Neurosci. 2003;4:847–50.
 55. Kant I. Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Erster Teil. Werke. Band 3. Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1968.
 56. Unger P. Living high and letting die: Our illusion of inocence. New York: 
Oxford University Press; 1996.
 57. Hauser MD. Moral minds: How nature designed our universal sense of 
right and wrong. New York: Abacus; 2008.
 58. Wilson JQ. The moral sense. New York: Free Press; 1993.
 59. Hamilton WD. The evolution of altruistic behavior. Am Natural. 
1964;97:354–6.
 60. Figueroa G. What is neuroethics? Boletín de la Academia Chilena de 
Medicina. 2013; L: 89–100.
 61. Popper KR. Logik der Forschung. Tübingen: Mohr; 1935.
 62. García Yebra V, editor. Metafísica de Aristóteles. 2 Volúmenes. Madrid: 
Gredos, 1970.
 63. Varela F. Neurophenomenology: a methodological remedy to the hard 
problem. J Cons Studies. 1996;3:330–50.
 64. Zubiri X. Los problemas fundamentals de la metafísica occidental. Madrid: 
Alianza; 1994.
 65. Hume D. Treatise of human nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1978.
 66. Heidegger M. Sein und Zeit. 10th ed. Tübingen: Niemeyer; 1963.
 67. Heidegger M. Wissenschaft und Besinnung. In: Vortäge und Aufsätze. 
5.Aufl. Pfullingen: Neske, 1967. p. 41–66.
 68. Leibbrand W, Wettley A, Wahnsinn D. Geschichte der abendländische 
Psychopathologie. Freiburg/München: Karl Alber; 1961.
 69. Figueroa G. The ambitions of neuroethics: to find the scientific funda-
ments of morals. Acta Bioethica. 2013;19:259–68.
 70. Heidegger M. Zollikoner Seminare. Protokolle—Zwiegespräche—Briefe. 
2. Auflage. Frankurt: Klostermann, 1994.
